Will monitoring interfere with our control systems?

No. We use passive, OT-aware monitoring that observes industrial traffic without injecting into or disrupting the control systems. The plant floor keeps running exactly as it does today, and you gain visibility you didn't have before.

What is Purdue-model segmentation, in plain terms?

It's a way of layering the network so business systems, an in-between industrial DMZ, and the control network are separated by controlled boundaries. If a laptop in the office is compromised, segmentation stops it from reaching a PLC on the line, because the two are no longer on the same flat network.

Can you secure machines that can't be patched?

Yes, and it's often the main reason to segment. Most OT vulnerabilities have no vendor patch, so we isolate that equipment behind segmentation, control who and what can reach it, and monitor it, rather than forcing updates that would break production.

How do you handle equipment vendor remote access?

Through a controlled path: access is brokered through the industrial DMZ, authenticated, time-bound where possible, and logged. Vendors get the access they need to support a machine without a standing, unmonitored connection into your plant.

Industrial network monitoring

See the plant floor. Contain the risk.

You can't protect what you can't see, and a flat network lets one compromised laptop reach a controller. NBIT gives you full visibility into your OT network and segments it so a problem on one side can't take down the line.

Book a discovery call or call (888) 816-6248

In short

Industrial network monitoring and segmentation give a manufacturer two things: a live view of every device on the OT network, and boundaries between business IT and the plant floor so a compromise can't spread to production. Together they turn an invisible, flat network into one you can see and contain.

The problem

Why plant-floor networks are hard to defend.

You can't protect what you can't see

Most plants have no complete inventory of what's on the OT network: PLCs, HMIs, drives, sensors, engineering laptops, and vendor devices that come and go. Unknown assets are where risk hides.

Flat networks let problems spread

When business IT and the plant floor share one network, a phished laptop or a piece of malware can reach a controller. There's nothing between the outage and the line.

OT traffic looks nothing like office traffic

Industrial protocols and always-on control systems don't behave like email and browsers. Office-grade monitoring either misses what matters or generates noise nobody can act on.

Remote access is the quiet back door

Equipment vendors and integrators need to reach machines, and uncontrolled or unmonitored remote access is one of the most common ways attackers get onto a plant floor.

What's included

What NBIT puts in place.

OT asset discovery and inventory

We build and maintain a live inventory of what's actually on your industrial network, so you know every device that could be a target or a blind spot.

Passive industrial monitoring

Monitoring designed for OT: it watches industrial traffic without interfering with the control systems, flags anomalies and unexpected connections, and turns plant-floor activity into alerts your team can act on.

Purdue-model segmentation

Network architecture built on the Purdue Model and IEC 62443, with clear boundaries between business IT, the industrial DMZ, and control networks, so a compromise on one level can't cascade to the next.

Industrial DMZ and controlled remote access

A demilitarized zone between IT and OT, plus brokered, authenticated, and logged remote access for equipment vendors, so support happens without leaving a door open.

Protection for what can't be patched

For legacy equipment with no available patch, segmentation and monitoring become the control: the machine is isolated and watched rather than exposed on a flat network.

Who this is for

Manufacturers whose business IT and plant floor still share one flat network
Plants with legacy PLCs, SCADA, or control PCs that can't be patched
Operations that grant equipment vendors remote access to machines
Regulated manufacturers that need to demonstrate OT visibility and segmentation

Common questions

Monitoring and segmentation, answered.

Will monitoring interfere with our control systems?: No. We use passive, OT-aware monitoring that observes industrial traffic without injecting into or disrupting the control systems. The plant floor keeps running exactly as it does today, and you gain visibility you didn't have before.
What is Purdue-model segmentation, in plain terms?: It's a way of layering the network so business systems, an in-between industrial DMZ, and the control network are separated by controlled boundaries. If a laptop in the office is compromised, segmentation stops it from reaching a PLC on the line, because the two are no longer on the same flat network.
Can you secure machines that can't be patched?: Yes, and it's often the main reason to segment. Most OT vulnerabilities have no vendor patch, so we isolate that equipment behind segmentation, control who and what can reach it, and monitor it, rather than forcing updates that would break production.
How do you handle equipment vendor remote access?: Through a controlled path: access is brokered through the industrial DMZ, authenticated, time-bound where possible, and logged. Vendors get the access they need to support a machine without a standing, unmonitored connection into your plant.

Get visibility into your plant floor.

Book a 30-minute discovery call and we'll talk through what's on your OT network today, where business IT and production still overlap, and what monitoring and segmentation would take in your environment.

Book a discovery call or call (888) 816-6248